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Abstract.  We use data from Vickrey uniform auctions to provide an indirect robustness test of the 
endowment effect idea that people treat opportunity costs differently from out-of-pocket costs.  The panel 
data suggests two results: (1) evidence of the endowment effect exists—risk seeking behavior after a loss 
is less severe for 'out of pocket' losses relative to foregone gain.  We found no support for the prediction 
that bidders recoil from future losses following a realized loss (i.e., become more risk averse); and (2) a 
form of gamblers fallacy termed the escalation of commitment better explains bidding behavior for 
inexperienced bidders—risk seeking bidding behavior is observed following a loss.  But as bidders gain 
experience the escalation of commitment is attenuated for ―out of pocket‖ losses but not for foregone 
gains.   
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1. Introduction 
Do people treat opportunity costs differently from out-of-pocket costs?  The answer is ‗yes‘ if 
you accept the behavioral notion of the endowment effect—people value goods in their possession more 
than identical goods they do not own (see Kahneman et al., 1986, 1990, 1991).  Kahneman et al. (1991) 
state ―[A]n implication of the endowment effect is that people treat opportunity costs differently than ―out 
of pocket‖ costs.  Foregone gains are less painful than perceived losses‖ (pp. 203).   Real pocketbook 
expenses affect behavior more than abstract notions of ―the path not taken‖, i.e., foregone gains.1  Herein 
we examine this conjecture indirectly by examining bidding behavior in a classic demand revealing 
Vickrey auction experiment.
2
  In the auction, overbidding risks real out of pocket costs when the price 
exceeds value; whereas underbidding risks foregoing a valuable opportunity.  If the endowment effect 
holds, over-bidders should become more risk averse with 'out of pocket' losses relative to foregone gains.
3
  
Using a two way fixed effects model with inexperience (rounds 2-10) and experience (rounds 11-
20) bidders, we cannot reject the endowment effect influence on bidding behavior.  However, we do note 
the expected reaction was not observed.  Rather another behavioral phenomenon better explains the 
behavior of inexperienced bidders—the escalation of commitment4 as bidders become more aggressive 
after a loss (see Staw, 1976; Weber and Zuchel, 2005).
 5
  We observe risk seeking bidding behavior 
following an out of pocket loss for inexperienced bidders.  As bidders gain experience with the auction, 
                                                 
1
 Loomes et al. (2003) market discipline hypothesis is similar to this Kahneman et al. (1991) definition of the 
endowment effect.  The primary difference is Kahneman et al. (1991) suggest the marginal effect of ―out of pocket 
costs‖ will exceed the marginal effect of foregone gains.   The market discipline hypothesis proposes costly losses 
will cause people to adjust behavior towards predictive behavior.    
2
Recall in the Vickrey (1961) uniform auction, the weakly dominant strategy is to bid ones true value; profits are 
maximized when the individual‘s bid is demand revealing.  The notion of the endowment effect has been attached to 
bidding behavior in auctions in previous research.  van Dijk and van Knippenberg (1996) find an endowment effect 
in a bargaining chip market with uncertain prices.  Bidders underbid their stated WTP to avoid losses.  van de Ven et 
al. (2005) find that the endowment effect may be impacted by bidders curiosity over uncertain prices, when only 
bidders in possession of a bargaining chip are provided market price at the conclusion of the auction.  
3This form of the endowment effect is consistent with Thaler and Johnson‘s (1990) ―house money effect‖ hypothesis 
where individuals become more risk averse following a loss.  Thaler and Johnson (1990) do find evidence that 
people will take on more risk following a loss if the gamble is a break even bet.  In a Vickrey auction betting one‘s 
own value maximizes the payoffs without incurring any risk, therefore, risk seeking behavior only serves to increase 
the potential for losses with no added gain. 
4
See Croson and Sundali (2005). 
5
Staws (1976) escalation of commitment hypothesis is commonly applied to risky investment decisions and is akin 
to the disposition affect (see Weber and Zuchel, 2005).   
their bidding behavior remains constant following a loss.  For bidders who suffered through foregone 
gains, risk-seeking bidding behavior was evident with and without auction experience.  
2. Experimental Design 
To test the hypotheses here, we use data from bidding behavior within two Vickrey 
auctions—the uniform 2nd-price and random nth-price WTP auction. The data comes from two 
experimental studies—Parkhurst et al. (2004) and Shogren et al. (2006).  The specific details of 
each study (e.g., the distributions of induced values) are found in these papers, we now briefly 
highlight the design of the experiments to illustrate why we can use the data to focus on 
individual responses to ―out of pocket‖ costs and foregone gains.  Both auctions have the same 
weakly dominant strategy, and profit maximizing bidding behavior.  If you overbid and the 
market clearing price falls between your bid and induced value you earn negative profits (―out of 
pocket‖ loss) or if you underbid and the market clearing price is less than your induced value you 
experience a foregone profitable opportunity (foregone gains).      
Three sets of experiments were conducted at the University of Wyoming.  Students were 
recruited from undergraduate economic courses and asked to show up at an experimental lab at a 
specified time.  Subjects were given the experimental instructions, which the monitor read aloud.  
Subjects were encouraged to ask questions to reduce any misconceptions.
6
  The instructions were 
identical (except for the market clearing price information, either the 2
nd
 or random n
th
 highest 
bid), and used a nine step process.  Step 1: each bidder received a value sheet that had his private 
resale value for the round.  The bidder‘s resale value is the price the monitor pays if he were the 
highest bidder.  Step 2: bidders learned the rules of the auction mechanism.  For the 2
nd
 price 
auction, the highest bidder buys the good at the price set by the 2
nd 
highest bid.  In the random n
th
 
                                                 
6
 Misconceptions are still feasible.  Our question and answer period (training) was less extensive than in Plott and 
Zeiler (2005).  Further our subjects were not provided paid or hypothetical practice rounds; bidders were allowed to 
learn through actual market experience (see Shogren et al., 1994).     
price auction, the (n -1) highest bidders buy the good at the price set by the random n
th
 highest 
bid.
7
  Bidders were not informed of the optimal strategy.  Step 3: the monitor ranked the bids 
from highest to lowest.  Step 4: the second highest (or random n
th
 highest) bid set the market-
clearing price.  Step 5: the monitor posted the market-clearing price as public information.  Step 
6: the highest bidder(s) purchased one unit of the good at the market price.  Step 7: the highest 
bidder(s) then sold the unit back to the monitor at his assigned resale value for that auction.  The 
bidder‘s profits equaled the difference between his resale value and the market-clearing price for 
that round: profits = resale value – market price.  Subjects knew negative profits were possible; 
profits were private information.  Step 8: bidders at or below the market-clearing price did not 
purchase the good and recorded zero profits.  Step 9: the round ended; they returned to Step 1.   
Subjects maintained a record sheet on which they recorded their induced values, bids, 
market price, and profits or losses for each round.  Profit calculations were double checked by 
the monitor following each round.  The experimental design biases our results towards revelation 
of an endowment effect because each subject is given information that identifies when they incur 
an 'out of pocket' loss, e.g., negative profits, but subjects did not get explicit information when 
they forego profitable opportunities.     
All subjects were paid a $5 show up fee.  The experimental instructions and the 
experiment monitor explained that final take-home pay would be $5.00 + aggregate earnings.  
Subjects were responsible for all losses and losses could erode into the show up fee.   Subjects 
maintained a running total with final payoffs being paid at the end of the experiment.       
 
3. A Reduced Form Model 
                                                 
7
 See Shogren et al. (2001b) for an overview and introduction to the random n
th
 price auction. 
 To examine the influence of the endowment effect and the escalation of commitment on 
bidding behavior, we use the following reduced-form model:   
        (1) 
Equation (1) specifies bid (Bid) as a function of induced value (IN), prior period loss (LLoss), 
prior period foregone gains (LOC), and prior period profits (LGain).  The theory underlying the 
Vickrey second price auction posits a weakly dominant strategy of demand revelation within an 
auction and independence across auctions.  If theory holds, expected marginal effects are:   
                 (2) 
           (3) 
           (4) 
            (5) 
Given the theoretical results, we redefine the dependent variable as the deviation of the bid from 
the induced value (Bid – IN), and represent equation 2 as:   
          (6) 
Eq. 6 indicates the bid-induced value deviation is a function of prior period losses (LLoss), prior 
period foregone gains (LOC), and prior period profits (LGain).   
For a bidder to have incurred a loss in the prior auction (LLoss > 0), he would have been 
the highest bidder, and his induced value was less than the market price which is less than his bid 
(IN < Price < Bid).  In this case, bid - induced value deviation would be positive.   
To have incurred a foregone gain in the prior auction (LOC > 0), the bidder would need 
to have not been the highest bidder (second highest bidder or lower), and his induced value must 
be greater than the market price which is greater than or equal to his bid (IN > Price ≥ Bid).  In 
this case, bid – induced value deviation would be negative.  
Finally, to have incurred a gain in the prior auction (LGain > 0), the bidder would need to 
have been the highest bidder, and his induced value must be greater than the market price (IN > 
price; Bid > Price).  The bid – induced value deviation could be positive or negative with the 
lower bound being bid equal to market price plus one cent less induced value (Bid = price + 0.01 
– IN).           
 
Endowment Effect 
If  bidders do adjust behavior in accordance with the associated pain, and ―out of pocket‖ 
expenses are more painful than foregone opportunities (Kahneman et al., 1991), we expect 
bidders will adjust their bidding behavior more expediently when incurring a realized loss.  The 
expected marginal effects are: 
           (7) 
            (8) 
with  
                           (9) 
 
Escalation of Commitment 
Escalation of commitment suggests bidders will commit further into the present strategy when 
losses or foregone gains are encountered.   Escalation of commitment can be characterized as 
throwing good money after bad or doubling down on a bad strategy.  Here, the expectation 
would be for deviations to become larger following a loss as people bid more aggressively to 
win.  For foregone gains, the deviation will become smaller (a larger negative).   The expected 
marginal effects are: 
            (10) 
            (11) 
We would expect the marginal effect on prior gains to be zero.     
4. Results 
Table 1 reports bidding behavior across all rounds for both auctions and different subsets 
of each auction.  Starting with the statistics on deviations, on average people overbid their 
induced values by $0.49 with a variance of 20.98.  Maximum and minimum deviations are 45.60 
and -26.40.
8
  Focusing on rounds 2-10 (Table 1, column 2) we see that the majority of the 
variance (30.81) can be explained in the early rounds—when people are figuring out the 
intricacies of the institution.  In latter rounds (column 3) the variance (12.10) is much smaller 
although a couple of relatively large deviations are still present.  Further, overbidding was 
greater in early rounds (dev = 0.77) than in latter rounds (dev = 0.24).  In the n
th
-price auction, 
deviations indicate people underbid by $0.03 with variance (40.88) and maximum (45.60) and 
minimum (-48.50).  In early rounds (2-10) of the random n
th
-price auction bidders overbid by 
0.42 and in latter rounds (11-20) underbid by 0.42.  Similar to the 2
nd
 price auctions, variances 
were distinctly larger in early rounds (55.58) relative to later rounds (27.82).    
 Turning now to losses, we see that average losses are $6.06 with losses being larger in 
early rounds (6.65) relative to later rounds (4.96).  The variance across losses also decreases in 
                                                 
8
 We exclude outliers in which the absolute value of the deviation was greater than $50.00, which consisted of 14 
observations in the 2
nd
 price auction and 36 in the random n
th
 price auction.  The end result in the 2
nd
 price auction is 
a change in the deviation from 0.33 to 0.49 and a change in the variance from 1453 to 21.66. In the random n
th
 price 
auction, -2731.06 to -.03 and change in variance from 2.64E+09 to 40.88.   See Appendix 1.  For the random n
th
 
price auction strategic bidding behavior was observed (see Parkhurst et al., 2004). 
later rounds.  Note that some relatively large losses were experienced (max = $39.90).  In the 
random n
th
-price auction losses were much smaller ($3.15) with a tighter variance (8.82) and the 
maximum was $12.80.  Also, average losses were larger in early rounds (4.01) relative to later 
rounds (2.03).  For OC the average missed opportunity and variance were small ($0.63).  Again, 
average OC decreased with experience, $0.75 to $0.48.  Note, in the 2
nd
 price auction the average 
loss is roughly 10 times greater in magnitude than the average OC, implying bidders will likely 
pay more attention to larger ‗out of pocket‘ costs then they would smaller foregone gains, further 
biasing our results towards evidencing an endowment effect (see Shogren et al. 2006).  In the 
random nth-price auction OC, $1.22, was much closer to the observed losses, but still losses are 
roughly 2.5 times larger on average.  Here again, average opportunity cost decreased with 
experience from 1.31 to 1.15.   
  4.1. Econometric Analysis  
 We examine the auction data using conditional panel regression analysis.  Assume 
deviations of bids from induced values (bid-IN) are explained by the previous rounds losses, 
gains, and opportunity costs.  We use a fixed effects model to test how prior rounds gains, losses 
and OC affect bidding:  
 (12) 
where bidi,t is bidder i‘s bid in round t; INi,t is i‘s induced value in round t; LLOSSi,t-1 is i‘s 
negative profit in round t-1.  If bidder i did not experience a negative profit in round t-1, 
LLOSSi,t-1 = 0; LOCi,t-1 is i's foregone opportunity cost in round t-1.  LOCi,t-1 = 0 when i did not 
experience a foregone opportunity in round t-1; LGAINi,t-1 is i‘s positive profit in round t-1.  If 
bidder i did not experience a positive profit in round t-1, LGAINi,t-1 = 0; ui is an individual fixed 
effect representing subject-specific characteristics; φt represents trial-specific fixed effects, 
including learning or other trends in bidding behavior; and εit is iid error.
9
  In equation (12) 
demand revelation implies:    = 1 = 2 = 3 = i = t = 0 i,t.   
4.2. Predictions.   
We test two hypotheses:  (1) Endowment effect.  If the endowment effect exists in our 
auction data we expect β1 < 0 and β2 > 0.  Also, if a priori expectations on β1 and β2 are met, we 
expect more risk averse bidding behavior after out of pocket losses, therefore (β1 + β2) < 0.
10
  
People who incur losses, either ―out of pocket‖ or foregone gains, will bid more accurately in the 
subsequent round.  Recall, a loss occurs if the person overbids and a foregone gain if the person 
underbids.  More accurate bidding will reduce the observed deviation for LLoss and increase the 
observed deviation for LOC.  People are impacted more severely with a loss relative to a 
foregone gain.
11
   
(2) Gamblers Fallacy/Escalation of Commitment.  If the escalation of commitment 
explains behavior (see Staw, 1976), we expect β1 > 0 and β2 < 0.  If bidders see rounds as 
interdependent and prior losses affect future gains people will bid more aggressively taking on 
more risk following a loss.  If  overbidding does results in gains in future rounds bidders can 
justify their dominated bidding behavior as having the ‗appearance‘ of being rational (Festinger, 
1957).    
                                                 
9
 The Hausman test supports the use of a fixed effect over random effects at a minimum of 5% for all samples (see 
Green, 1997, p. 632-633).  The two way random effects provide similar results (see Table 4).  
10
 Alternatively, if β1 > 0 and β2 < 0, the endowment effect may still exist if we see risk seeking behavior is greater 
for LOC relative to LLoss, or β1 < |β2|, implying (β1 + β2) < 0.  
11
 Our study does not lend itself to an examination of gain seeking behavior.  Gain seeking is the opposite of loss 
aversion and is defined as people placing a greater value on gains than on the equivalent loss (see Brooks and Zank, 
2005; Bleichrodt and Pinto 2002; Abdellaoui et al., 2005).  Bidding behavior in uniform auctions is not conducive to 
discerning between loss aversion, gain seeking, and loss neutrality.  Overbidding in an auction has two convoluting 
effects—changes in expected market price and changes in the probability of winning, both effecting expected 
profits.  But once stung by a loss, loss aversion would predict the individual to recoil from future losses by bidding 
more accurately or perhaps even underbidding in subsequent rounds. The observed tendency of people to follow a 
foregone gain (caused by underbidding) with an increase in the magnitude of underbidding is also not conclusive 
evidence of loss aversion.  Although underbidding reduces the likelihood of people incurring an ‗out of pocket‘ loss 
to zero, and may be a manifestation of loss aversion, it could also be a result of an individual‘s misconceptions (Plott 
and Zeiler, 2005) or people strategically underbidding their value in an attempt to acquire a deal (Brown, 2005).   
Result 1.  As expected given the biased nature of our data, an endowment effect is 
observed overall observations for inexperienced and experienced bidders in the 2
nd
 price 
auction.  In the random n
th
 price auction, we find no evidence of the endowment effect.    
 
Support.   From Table 3, for the 2
nd
 price treatments, we see the coefficient on LOC is negative 
and significant overall observations and for both inexperienced and experienced bidders in the 
2
nd
-price auction.  Also, the estimated coefficient on LLOSS is positive and significant overall 
observations and for inexperienced bidders and positive and insignificant for experienced 
bidders.  Both coefficients are opposite of the predicted signs.  In the random n
th
-price treatment, 
the estimated coefficient on LOC is not significantly different from 0 for all observation or for 
inexperienced or experienced bidders.  The coefficient on LLOSS is either positive or not 
significantly different from zero for all three regressions.  Overall, bidders who experience a loss 
either have constant bidding behavior or become more risk seeking, exactly opposite of the 
bidding behavior predicted by the endowment effect.  We cannot, however, rule out the existence 
of the endowment effect in the second price auction overall and for experienced bidders because 
the proportional risk seeking behavior was greater following a foregone gain than an out of 
pocket loss.
12
    
Result 2.  Inexperienced bidders in the 2
nd
-price auction are subject to a form of the 
gamblers fallacy termed escalation of commitment.  Bidders become more risk seeking 
following a loss.  The escalation of commitment disappears, however, for experienced 
bidders who experienced an 'out of pocket' loss; but escalation remains for those who 
had foregone gains.     
    
Support.  For inexperienced bidders (Table 3 column 2), we observe the coefficient on LLOSS is 
positive (0.28) and statistical different from zero at the 1% significance level—the bid - IN 
deviation increases 0.28 for each dollar increase in LLOSS.  From Table 2, column 2 we see the 
average loss is 0.50, which implies a 0.14 increase in deviation per observation.  Further, from 
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 A test of the null hypotheses, HO: (β1 + β2) ≥ 0 yields the following t-statistics: 2
nd
 price auction rounds 2-20, t = -
2.06; rounds 2-10, t = -1.19; rounds 11-20, t = -4.04.  For the random n
th
 price auction rounds 2-20, t = -0.50; rounds 
2-10, t = -1.22; and rounds 11-20, t = -0.55.  
Table 1 we see the average loss is $6.65 so bid-IN deviations increase by 1.86 on average 
following a loss.  The coefficient on LOC has a negative coefficient estimate (-0.99) which 
indicates the range for foregone opportunities increases following a prior period opportunity 
cost.  The mean bid decreased by $0.71 following an OC. 
 For experienced subjects, the coefficient on LLOSS, though negative (-0.12), is not 
statistically different from zero.  Bid-IN deviations are unaffected by prior losses.  Subjects 
appear to be learning in early rounds and then converging to a stable bidding strategy in later 
rounds.  The escalation of commitment by bidders seems to be a misconception that vanishes 
with experience.
13
  Plott and Zeiler (2005) observe in an incentive compatible BDM auction 
subjects initially do not seem to realize that overbidding can result in negative profits.  These 
misconceptions were attenuated with training and experience (see also Shogren et al., 1994, 
2001a).  Our results for out of pocket losses support this observation. 
 But for foregone opportunities subjects do not seem to be internalizing their losses and do 
not tend to correct their bidding strategy, as observed by the increased commitment to 
underbidding.  Peoples' absolute bid deviations increased on average by $1.20 following an OC.  
People do not seem to be realizing the error in their bidding and continue to search for a bid 
deviation that makes their dominated strategy successful.
14
     
                                                 
13
 Weber and Zuchel (2005) find escalation of commitment—or risk seeking following a loss exists in institutions 
that are framed to be interdependent.  In theory, an X-round uniform auction is assumed to be X independent 
auctions.  But some bidders may view the experiment as an interdependent auction of X rounds.  Interdependence 
between auctions could exist if bidders regard the final outcome of the experiment as their change in wealth.  They 
would not update their reference point after each round; instead they maintain a reference point associated with 
initial wealth.  Gains and losses within the experiment serve to add to or subtract from their show up fee.  Because 
experiments rarely force subjects to incur costs over show up fees payoffs for participation are truncated at zero.  
Bidders‘ final payoffs fall on the gain side of the utility function.  The implication is a loss of Y in round t shifts the 
bidder into the loss domain of the S-shaped utility function, in which they could view risk seeking behavior in round 
t+1 as providing a greater increase in gains relative to losses. 
14
 One idea is that loss aversion without endowment effect is another possible explanation for deviations from true 
value.  Although loss aversion without endowment effect applies to auctions for specific goods, and not necessarily 
for induced values (Brown, 2005), the implication in an induced value uniform WTP Vickrey auction is for subjects 
to bid less than or equal to their induced value regardless of the prior periods outcome.  For behavioral evidence of 
 5. Conclusion 
Did our bidders treat opportunity costs differently from out-of-pocket costs?  Yes, but not 
for the reasons one might expect based on the endowment theory.  Our regression results suggest 
that the escalation of commitment notion better organizes loss-driven bidding behavior than the 
classic endowment effect.   We observe inexperienced bidders influenced by prior ―out of 
pocket‖ losses, although the influence wanes as they gain experience (see Shogren et al., 1994; 
Plott and Zeiler, 2005).  But bidders do not seem to internalize foregone gains; although we do 
not rule out the endowment effect, bidders instead continue to escalate their commitment to an 
inferior strategy.  These results are consistent with the results of Biel et al. (2011) and Martinez 
et al. (2011) given ―out of pocket‖ costs are more apparent to bidders relative to foregone gains.  
Emotions, regret and disappointment are likely to have a larger impact on correcting bidding 
behavior following an a ―out of pocket‖ loss.  Additional work might consider a more direct test 
that explicitly informs bidders of both ―out of pocket‖ costs and foregone gains.  This would 
provide information to bidders such that both forms of losses would be transparent and then 
internalized.       
                                                                                                                                                             
loss aversion without endowment effect, we would expect the constant term to be negative (bid – induced value < 
0), and the coefficients on LLoss, LOC, and LGain to not differ from zero statistically.  Only one sample, 
experienced bidders in a random n
th
 price auction (Table 3) support this conjecture.  All inexperienced bidders as 
well as experienced second price uniform auction bidders did not behave as would be explained by loss aversion 
without endowment effect.      
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Table 1.  Sample Characteristics
&
 
 (1) 
2
nd 
(2-20) 
(2) 
2
nd 
(2-10) 
(3) 
2
nd 
(11-20) 
(4) 
N
th 
(2-20) 
(5) 
N
th 
(2-10) 
(6) 
N
th 
(11-20) 
 
Deviations 
      
# 2076 979 1097 1104 514 590 
Mean 0.49 0.77 0.24 -0.03 0.42 -0.42 
Median 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Variance 20.98 30.81 12.10 40.88 55.58 27.82 
Max 45.60 45.60 45.60 45.60 45.60 16.20 
Min -26.40 -26.40 -23.20 -48.50 -45.60 -48.50 
 
Loss 
      
# 114 74 40 85 48 37 
Mean 6.06 6.65 4.96 3.15 4.01 2.03 
Median 4.50 5.00 3.23 2.10 2.40 1.60 
Variance 45.31 58.34 20.18 8.82 11.49 3.30 
Max 39.90 39.90 17.70 12.80 12.80 7.25 
Min 0.01 0.01 0.20 0.05 0.05 0.10 
 
OC 
      
# 100 54 46 107 46 61 
Mean 0.63 0.75 0.48 1.22 1.31 1.15 
Median 0.30 0.40 0.20 0.85 0.68 0.90 
Variance 0.56 0.68 0.40 2.34 2.94 1.91 
Max 4.10 4.10 2.40 8.70 2.89 6.90 
Min 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 
Gains 
      
# 123 41 82 309 143 166 
Mean 1.36 1.70 1.18 2.57 3.11 2.36 
Median 1.15 1.40 1.11 2.32 2.42 1.90 
Variance 1.01 1.64 0.63 3.10 3.37 2.80 
Max 6.00 6.00 5.30 7.50 7.50 6.90 
Min 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.09 0.10 0.09 
& Deviations > 50.00 omitted 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 2.  Descriptive Statistics
&
 
 (1) 
2
nd 
 (2-20) 
(2) 
2
nd 
 (2-10) 
(3) 
2
nd 
 (11-20) 
(4) 
N
th 
(2-20) 
(5) 
N
th 
(2-10) 
(6) 
N
th 
(11-20) 
DEV 0.49 
(4.58) 
0.77 
(5.55) 
0.24 
(3.48) 
-0.03 
(6.39) 
0.42 
(7.45) 
-0.42 
(5.27) 
 
LLOSS 
 
0.33 
(2.09) 
 
0.50 
(2.73) 
 
0.18 
(1.26) 
 
0.24 
(1.17) 
 
0.37 
(1.55) 
 
0.13 
(0.67) 
 
LOC 
 
0.03 
(0.21) 
 
0.04 
(0.26) 
 
0.02 
(0.16) 
 
0.12 
(0.60) 
 
0.12 
(0.63) 
 
0.12 
(0.56) 
 
LGAIN 
 
0.08 
(0.40) 
 
0.07 
(0.43) 
 
0.09 
(0.38) 
 
0.72 
(1.49) 
 
0.79 
(1.60) 
 
0.66 
(1.38) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.  Panel Data Regression Results—Two Way Fixed Effects.& 
 2
nd 
(2-20) 
2
nd 
 (2-10) 
2
nd 
 (11-20) 
N
th 
(2-20) 
N
th 
(2-10) 
N
th 
(11-20) 
 
Constant 0.43
* 
(0.09) 
0.69
* 
(0.15) 
0.33
* 
(0.10) 
-0.06
 
(0.20) 
0.72
** 
(0.36) 
-0.46
* 
(0.18) 
 
 
LLoss 
 
0.31
* 
(0.05) 
 
0.28
* 
(0.06) 
 
-0.12 
(0.08) 
 
0.27
*** 
(0.15) 
 
-0.02
 
(0.21) 
 
-0.26 
(0.25) 
 
 
LOC 
 
-1.21
* 
(0.43) 
 
-0.99
*** 
(0.59) 
 
-2.49
* 
(0.63) 
 
-0.44
 
(0.30) 
 
-0.65
 
(0.50) 
 
0.04
 
(0.30) 
 
 
LGain 
 
 
-0.19 
(0.23) 
 
-0.30 
(0.36) 
 
-0.30 
(0.26) 
 
0.23 
(0.13) 
 
-0.26 
(0.22) 
 
0.11 
(0.13) 
 
 
Breush-
Pagan 
 
67.46622 
 
p< 0.001 
 
23.24522 
 
p< 0.001 
 
83.16922 
 
p< 0.001 
 
36.40422 
 
p< 0.001 
 
60.7422 
 
p< 0.001 
 
45.39822 
 
p< 0.001 
 
 
Hausma
n 
 
10.6222   
p< 0.001 
 
24.4422   
p< 0.001 
 
37.4422   
p< 0.001 
 
35.5922   
p< 0.001 
 
96.2422 
 
p< 0.001 
 
11.6022   
p< 0.001 
 
 
N 
 
2076 
 
979 
 
1097 
 
1104 
 
514 
 
590 
 
 
R
2 
 
0.29 
 
0.43 
 
0.31 
 
0.34 
 
0.35 
 
0.63 
 
&
 Absolute deviations > 50.00 are omitted 
*
1%, 
**
5%, 
***
10% 
Table 4.  Panel Data Regression Results—Two Way Random Effects.& 
 2
nd 
(2-20) 
2
nd 
 (2-10) 
2
nd 
 (11-20) 
N
th 
(2-20) 
N
th 
(2-10) 
N
th 
(11-20) 
 
Constant 0.39
** 
(0.18) 
0.60
** 
(0.29) 
0.28
 
(0.19) 
-0.16
 
(0.37) 
0.46
 
(0.60) 
-0.55
 
(0.46) 
 
 
LLoss 
 
0.39
* 
(0.04) 
 
0.40
* 
(0.06) 
 
0.02 
(0.08) 
 
0.41
* 
(0.14) 
 
-0.22
 
(0.20) 
 
0.02 
(0.25) 
 
 
LOC 
 
-1.11
* 
(0.43) 
 
-0.87
 
(0.58) 
 
-2.14
* 
(0.61) 
 
-0.83
* 
(0.29) 
 
-0.82
*** 
(0.48) 
 
-0.38
 
(0.29) 
 
 
LGain 
 
 
-0.14 
(0.22) 
 
-0.16 
(0.35) 
 
-0.25 
(0.25) 
 
0.10 
(0.12) 
 
-0.19 
(0.20) 
 
0.12 
(0.12) 
 
 
Breush-
Pagan 
 
67.46622 
 
p< 0.001 
 
23.24522 
 
p< 0.001 
 
83.16922 
 
p< 0.001 
 
36.40422 
 
p< 0.001 
 
60.7422 
 
p< 0.001 
 
45.39822 
 
p< 0.001 
 
 
Hausma
n 
 
10.6222   
p< 0.001 
 
24.4422   
p< 0.001 
 
37.4422   
p< 0.001 
 
35.5922   
p< 0.001 
 
96.2422 
p< 0.001 
 
11.6022   
p< 0.001 
 
 
N 
 
2076 
 
979 
 
1097 
 
1104 
 
514 
 
590 
 
 
R
2 
 
0.07 
 
0.10 
 
0.01 
 
0.05 
 
0.02 
 
0.09 
 
&
 Absolute deviations > 50.00 are omitted 
*
1%, 
**
5%, 
***
10% 
 
 
